UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

11-14-2011

State v. Allen Appellant's Brief Dckt. 38665

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
Recommended Citation
"State v. Allen Appellant's Brief Dckt. 38665" (2011). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 3255.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/3255

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,

)

NO. 38665

)

v.

)
)

MARK EDWARD ALLEN Ill,

)

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

)

Defendant-Appellant.

)

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

HONORABLE CARL B. KERRICK
District Judge

MOLLY J. HUSKEY
State Appellate Public Defender
State of Idaho
I.S.B. # 4843
SARA B. THOMAS
Chief, Appellate Unit
I.S.B. # 5867

KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
(208) 334-4534

ERIK R. LEHTINEN
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. # 6247
3050 N. Lake Harbor Lane, Suite 100
Boise, ID 83703
(208) 334-2712
ATTORNEYS FOR
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

ATTORNEY FOR
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................................... ii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ............................................................................... 1
Nature of the Case ..................................................................................... 1
Statement of the Facts and
Course of Proceedings ............................................................................. 1
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL. ..................................................................... 6
ARGUMENT ......................................................................................................... 7

The District Court Erred In Failing To Treat Mr. Allen's ''Motion"
For Post-Conviction Relief As A Petition For Post-Conviction
Relief Under The Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act.. ............................ 7
CONCLUSION ............................................................... .................................... 11

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING .............................................................................. 12

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Federal Cases

Dionne v. State, 93 Idaho 235 (1969) ............................................................. 7, 11
Freeman v. State, 115 Idaho 78, 79 (Ct. App. 1988) ............................................ 7
Hays v. State, 113 Idaho 736, 741 (Ct. App. 1987) .............................................. 7
Martin v. Spalding, 133 Idaho 469,472 (Ct. App. 1998) ....................................... 7
Palmer v. Dermitt, 102 Idaho 591 , 593 ( 1981) ...................................................... 7
Sparks v. State, 140 Idaho 292, 295-96 (Ct. App. 2004) ...................................... 8
State v. Jakoski, 139 Idaho 352, 355 (2003) .................................................. 9, 10
State v. Sands, 121 Idaho 1023, 1025-26 (Ct. App. 1992) ................................... 8

Statutes
I.C. § 19-4902 ....................................................................................................... 9
I.C. § 19-4906(b); or (b) ...................................................................................... 11
I.C. § 19-4907 ..................................................................................................... 11

Rules
I.C.R. 33(c) ..................................................................................................... 7, 10

ii

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Pursuant to a plea qgreement, l\/lark Allen pied guilty to a single count of felony
driving under the influence of alcohol ("DUI").

He received a unified sentence of five

years, with three years fixed.
After his time to appeal his conviction and sentence had expired, but before his
time to file a petition for post-conviction relief lapsed, Mr. Allen filed a "Motion for
Withdrawal of Guilty Plea" asserting that he had received ineffective assistance of
counsel and that his plea had not been knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered.
Later, Mr. Allen's counsel amended his "motion" in an attempt to clarify that it this was
brought under both Idaho Criminal Rule 33(c) (the Rule governing motions to withdraw
pleas) and I.C. § 19-4901 (the portion of the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedures Act
("UPCPA") setting forth the recognized bases for post-conviction relief).

Following a

hearing, however, the district court denied Mr. Allen's "motion."
Mr. Allen now appeals. He contends that it was error for the district court not to
have treated l·1is "motion" as a petition for post-conviction relief, and to have dealt with it
under the standards set forth in the UPCPA. He requests that his case be remanded to
the district court and treated a post-conviction matter.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
In May 2008,

Mark Allen was charged with felony DUI (R., pp.14-15),

misdemeanor driving without privileges (see R., p.24), and two infractions (violation of a

1

restricted driver's license and failure to carry insurance) (see R., p.24). 1 The felony DUI
is the charge that is directly at issue in this case.
After waiving his right to a preliminary hearing on the felony DUI, Mr. Allen was
bound over to the district court. (R., p.73.) On December 15, 2008, the State filed its
information. (R., pp.74-76.)
On or about May 14, 2009, Mr. Allen entered into a plea agreement with the
State. Under the terms of that agreement, Mr. Allen agreed to plead guilty to the felony
DUI charge and, apparently in exchange, the State agreed to dismiss the misdemeanor
driving without privileges charge. (See Tr., p.7, Ls.6-25, p.26, Ls.4-7.) In accordance
with the terms of that agreement, Mr. Allen did, in fact, plead guilty to the DUI.
(Tr., p.12, L.23 - p.13, L.6, p.23, L.25 - p.24, L.5.) The district court accepted that plea.
(Tr., p.24, Ls.6-12.)
Mr. Allen was sentenced on April 8, 2010. (See generally Tr., p.27, L.1 - p.38,
L.25.) At the conclusion of his sentencing hearing, the district court imposed a unified
sentence of five years, with three years fixed. (Tr., p.38, Ls.1-5; R., pp.101, 108.) The
district court entered its judgment of conviction on the following day, April 9, 2010.

(R., pp.107-09.)
Mr. Allen did not appeal his conviction or sentence. (See R., pp.8-10 (register of
actions showing the filing of no notices of appeal in the months following Mr. Allen's
April 8, 2010 sentencing hearing).)

1

It appears that the misdemeanor and infractions were charged in a separate case, Nez
Perce County Case No. CR-2008-3551.
(See Tr., p.26, Ls.4-7; see also Idaho
Supreme
Court
Data
Repository
(available
at
<https://www.idcourts.us/
repository/partySearch.do>) (providing register of actions for No. CR-2008-3551, which
shows charges matching those described above and indicating a "violation date" w~Iich
is the same as that which was alleged in this case).
2

On September 15, 2010, well after his time to appeal his conviction and/or
sentence had expired, see I.AR. 14(a) (requiring that the notice of appeal be filed within
42 days of the judgment), but well before the time limit for filing a petition for postconviction relief had run, see I.C. § 19-4902 (a) (requiring that any post-conviction
petition be filed within one year of expiration of the time to appeal), Mr. Allen, acting pro
se, filed a "Motion for Withdrawal of Guilty Plea," purportedly pursuant to Idaho Criminal

Rule 33(c) (R., p.126), and a supporting affidavit (R., pp.128-29).

In his affidavit,

Mr. Allen averred, inter a/ia, that: he is innocent of the felony DUI for which he stands
convicted; while in court, he "was heavily medicated and did not understand any of the
proceedings or what was transpiring in the courtroom"; his attorney failed to investigate
his case, adequate communicate with Mr. Allen, or "offer a defense"; he was coerced to
plead guilty by ~1is attorney; and, had he known what was going on, he would not have
pied guilty. (R., pp.128-29.)
On February 24, 2011, after counsel had been appointed to assist him (see

R., p.140), Mr. Allen, this time through his counsel, filed an "Amended Motion for
Withdrawal of Plea of Guilty and Motion for Post-Conviction Relief." (R., pp.148-49.) In
this document, Mr. Allen's counsel incorporated by reference Mr. Allen's September 15,
2010 prose affidavit and then went on to attempt to clarify Mr. Allen's claims as follows:
[T]he motion is made on the following grounds:
1. With respect to the motion to withdraw the plea, the
motion is based on Rule 33(c), I.C.R., and is made on the grounds
that, under the circumstances present, the plea was not intelligently
made and to allow the plea to stand would constitute a manifest
injustice;
2. With respect to the motion for post-conviction relief, the
motion is based on Idaho Code § 19-4901 and is made on the
grounds that the defendant believes: (a) he was not adequately
represented by ~1is prior counsel; (b) there exist material facts never
3

presented which require vacation of the conviction and sentence;
[and] (c) that the conviction and sentence are subject to collateral
attack.
(R., pp.148-49.)
On March 3, 2011, the district court held a hearing on Mr. Allen's "motion." (See
generally Tr., p.39, L.1 - p.51, L.24.)

Mr. Allen was not present for this hearing

(R., p.151) but, at the outset, his counsel again attempted to clarify Mr. Allen's claims:
I did file a motion to more accurately characterize Mr. Allen's documents
filed with the court as a-alternatively, a motion for withdrawal of plea or a
motion for post-conviction relief, because some of his-some of his
allegations seem to be really more in the nature of post conviction, but I
wanted to cover all the bases.
(Tr., p.39, Ls.16-22.) Counsel then went on to present arguments as to some of the
points raised in Mr. Allen's "motion." (See Tr., p.40, L.2 - p.45, L.17.)
In response, the prosecutor argued that Mr. Allen had failed to meet his burden
of showing a "manifest injustice" so as to be entitled to withdraw his plea under I.C.R.
33(c) (Tr., p.45, L.19 - p.46, L.3), but she went on to acknowledge that "if there's any
argument to be made, it would be under a post conviction relief petition for ineffective
assistance [o·~ counsel, if any argument at all." (Tr., p.46, Ls.4-8.) She then argued
briefly that Mr. Allen had failed to show any ineffectiveness on his counsel's part. (See
Tr., p.46, L.9 - p.47, L.25.)
Ultimately, the district court concluded that Mr. Allen's plea had been entered
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, and that he had therefore failed to satisfy the
"manifest injustice" standard of Rule 33(c), and it denied his "motion" on that basis.
(See Tr., p.48, L.13 - p.51, L.18.) The district court said nothing of Mr. Allen's claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel, and it made no mention of the UPCPA.
Tr., p.48, L.13 - p.51, L.18.)
4

(See

On March 17, 2011, the district court entered a written order memorializing its
oral ruling at the March 3, 2011 hearing. (R., p.152.) In its written order, the district
court did not elaborate on its rationale for denying Mr. Allen's "motion." (R., p.152.)
On March 18, 2011, Mr. Allen filed a notice of appeal which was timely only from
the district court's denial of his "motion" to withdraw his plea and obtain post-conviction
relief. (R., pp.154-56.) On appeal, he contends that it was error for the district court not
to have treated his "motion" as a petition for post-conviction relief, and to have dealt with
it under the standards set forth in the UPCPA. He requests that his case be remanded
to the district court and treated a post-conviction matter.

5

ISSUE
Did the district court err in failing to treat Mr. Allen's "motion" for post-conviction relief as
a petition for post-conviction under the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedures Act?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred In Failing To Treat Mr. Allen's "Motion" For Post-Conviction
Relief As A Petition For Post-Conviction Relief Under The Uniform Post-Conviction
Procedure Act
The "motion" at issue in this case, when it was originally filed by Mr. Allen himself
(pro se), bore the case number of his criminal case and was specifically based on one

of the criminal rules (I.C.R. 33(c)). (See R., p.126.) Even after counsel was appointed
and Mr. Allen's attorney sought to clarify Mr. Allen's argument through an amended
"motion," that document was again filed in the criminal case and, in part, continued to be
based on one of the criminal rules.

(See R., pp.148-49.)

Nevertheless, Mr. Allen

contends that the district court should have treated his "motion" as a petition for postconviction relief.
It is well-established in Idaho that, with respect to post-judgment filings made by
those convicted of crimes, a mislabeled pleading must be treated according to its
substance. See, e.g., Palmer v. Oermitt, 102 Idaho 591, 593 (1981) (treating a petition
for a writ of habeas corpus as an application for post-conviction relief); Dionne v. State,
93 Idaho 235, 237-38 (1969) (observing, "[i]t is immaterial whether a petition or
application is labeled Habeas Corpus or Post Conviction proceeding" because
"[s]ubstance not form governs," and suggesting that, had the petitioner not specifically
objected, it would have treated ~1is habeas petition as a post-conviction petition because
it asserted a claim more appropriately raised in a post-conviction petition); Martin v.
Spalding, 133 Idaho 469, 472 (Ct. App. 1998) (treating a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus as a complaint for damages where the pleading claimed compensation for an

unlawful taking of an inmate's property); Freeman v. State, 115 Idaho 78, 79 (Ct. App.
1988) (same); Hays v. State, 113 Idaho 736, 741 (Ct. App. 1987) (treating an
7

application for post-conviction relief as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus where the
applicant claimed that he was not receiving legally required psychological treatment
during l1is incarceration).
In this case, the substance of Mr. Allen's "motion" makes it clear that it should
have been treated as a petition for post-conviction relief. Mr. Allen asserted two types
of claims-ineffective assistance of counsel and an unknowing, unintelligent, or
involuntary guilty plea (see R., pp.128-29, 149)-both of which are appropriately
asserted through post-conviction petitions. See Sparks v. State, 140 Idaho 292, 295-96
(Ct. App. 2004) ("Ordinarily, we do not address claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel on direct appeal because the record on direct appeal is rarely adequate for
review of such claims.

Such claims are more appropriately presented through post-

conviction relief proceedings where an evidentiary record can be developed."); State v.
Sands, 121 Idaho 1023, 1025-26 (Ct. App. 1992) (holding that one who pleads guilty to
a crime may seek to withdraw his plea as having been unknowingly, unintelligently, or
involuntarily entered either through the filing of a motion in his criminal case or through
an application for post-conviction relief). Indeed, when Mr. Allen amended his "motion"
with the assistance of counsel, he made it clear that his "motion" was premised, at least
in part, on Idaho's Post-Conviction Procedures Act, I.C. § 19-4901 et seq. As quoted
above, he asserted as follows:
[T]he motion is made on the following grounds:
1. With respect to the motion to withdraw the plea, the
motion is based on Rule 33(c), I.C.R., and is made on the grounds
that, under the circumstances present, the plea was not intelligently
made and to allow the plea to stand would constitute a manifest
injustice;
2. With respect to the motion for post-conviction relief, the
motion is based on Idaho Code § 19-4901 and is made on the
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grounds that the defendant believes: (a) he was not adequately
represented by his prior counsel; (b) there exist material facts never
presented which require vacation of the conviction and sentence;
[and] ( c) that the conviction and sentence are subject to collateral
attack.
(R., pp.148-49 (emphasis added).)

Later, at the hearing on his motion, Mr. Allen's

counsel again attempted to clarify his claims:
I did file a motion to more accurately characterize Mr. Allen's documents
filed with the court as a-alternatively, a motion for withdrawal of plea or~
motion for post-conviction relief, because some of his-some of his
allegations seem to be really more in the nature of post conviction, but I
wanted to cover all the bases.
(Tr., p.39, Ls.16-22 (emphasis added).)
It is inexplicable why, in clarifying that at least some of Mr. Allen's claims were
2

post-conviction claims brought under the UPCPA, counsel for Mr. Allen failed to comply
with the UPCPA by filing a separate petition for post-conviction relief, see I.C. § 1949023; however, the reason for this failure is of no consequence because the claims

2

Counsel would have been wise to have asserted that all of Mr. Allen's claims,
including his claim that his plea was not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered,
were brought under the UPCPA since, insofar as the "motion" was brought under Idaho
Criminal Rule 33(c), the district court lacked jurisdiction to grant the relief requested,
i.e., withdrawal of Mr. Allen's plea, because the deadline to appeal had long since
passed. See State v. Jakoski, 139 Idaho 352, 355 (2003) (holding that jurisdiction to
allow withdrawal of a guilty plea pursuant to I.C.R. 33(c) expires when the judgment
becomes final-when the appeal concludes or, in the absence of an appeal, when the
time to appeal expires).
3 For reasons that are not clear, the Clerk's Record contains a copy of a letter sent from
Mr. Allen to his attorney, Danny Radakovich. (See R., p.142.) The State may point to
that letter as evidencing Mr. Allen's desire not to have his "motion" treated as a petition
for post-conviction relief; however, a close reading of that letter reveals that Mr. Allen's
concerns were with Mr. Radakovich "changing" his Rule 33(c) motion to withdraw his
plea into a post-conviction petition without explaining why it was necessary to do so:
I have been trying to contact you about what is going on with my
case, but as of date, I have not been able to reach you.
The letter regarding my questions about your reasoning behind
changing my Rule 33c into a post conviction, has not been responded to.
Why?
9

presented are clearly post-conviction claims.

Because, substantively, they are post-

conviction claims, the district court should have treated them as such.
Admittedly, in Jaksoski, supra, the Idaho Supreme Court held that the rationale of
Dionne, supra, (and presumably the other cases of a similar ilk that are cited above)
does not extend to motions filed in criminal cases, even where those motions state
claims that are typically most appropriately raised in post-conviction petitions, because
"[l]t would be too much of a stretch to hold that a motion filed in a criminal case can be
considered as a pleading commencing civil litigation."

Jaksoski, 139 Idaho at 355.

However, this holding of Jakoski is inapplicable in the present case because the facts of
Jakoski were materially different than those of this case.

In Jakoski, although the

motion the defendant filed in l·1is criminal case asserted what would typically be raised
as post-conviction claims, the defendant did not specifically request that his claims be
considered under the UPCPA. In contrast, in this case, Mr. Allen specifically asserted
that his "motion" was based, at least in part, "on Idaho Code § 19-4901" (R., p.149), the
portion of the UPCPA that sets forth the grounds for post-conviction relief in Idaho. In
addition, at the hearing on Mr. Allen's "motion," his counsel made it clear that his
"motion" was presented "alternatively" as "a motion for withdrawal of plea or a motion for
post-conviction relief, because some of his-some of his allegations seem to be really
more in the nature of post conviction .... " (Tr., p.39, Ls.16-22.) Accordingly, it would
not have been a stretch at all for the district court to have treated the filing in Mr. Allen's

At this time, I do not want you to disregard my Rule 33c for a post
conviction, mostly when you have not explained why you want to do this.
(R., p.142 (emphasis added).) Ultimately, the record does not reveal why counsel acted
as he did in filing an amended "motion," instead of a petition for post-conviction relief, on
Mr. Allen's behalf.
10

criminal case as a pleading commencing a post-conviction action.

Indeed, because

Mr. Allen's filing was, substantively, a petition for post-conviction relief, it was error not
to treat it as such. See Dionne, 93 Idaho at 237-38.
Assuming that Mr. Allen's "motion" was, in effect, a petition for post-conviction
relief, the district court incorrectly disposed of it. Under the UPCPA, the district court
was free to either: (a) summarily dismiss Mr. Allen's claims if it was satisfied that
Mr. Allen had failed to present allegations and evidence sufficient to raise a genuine
issue of material fact as to a matter upon which post-conviction relief could be granted,
and it provided Mr. Allen with prior notice of its intent to dismiss his claims and an
opportunity to respond, see I.C. § 19-4906(b); or (b) deny relief if, after an evidentiary
hearing, it found that Mr. Allen failed to prove his claims, see I.C. § 19-4907. In this
case, however, the district court failed to give any prior notice of its intent to dismiss any
of Mr. Allen's claims, and it did not hold an evidentiary hearing; as noted, the district
court simply treated Mr. Allen's "motion" as an Idaho Criminal Rule 33(c) motion, and
denied it after hearing oral argument from Mr. Allen's counsel. (See generally Tr., p.39,
L.1 - p.51, L.24.) Accordingly, the case should be remanded to the district court.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Allen respectfully requests that this Court vacate
the district court's order denying his "motion," and that it remand his case with an
instruction that his "motion" be treated as a petition for post-conviction relief under tl1e
Post-Conviction Procedures Act.
DATED this 14th day of I\Jovember,

Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
11
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